The North-South dialogue, between the industrialized nations of the Northern Hemisphere and the Less Developed Countries of the Southern Hemisphere, has resulted, for more than four decades, in a massive flow of capital, technology, manpower and expertise southward. This phenomenon has produced a series of sometimes cataclysmic events and, at other times, a wave of subtle changes with effects of varying duration and intensity. It is the intention of this paper to explore many of the changes which have altered the Third World, perhaps irreversibly, in terms of economic growth, socio-political stability, national priorities, infrastructural development objectives and cultural impact.
To do so within the space allotted, three representative nations have been selected with a view toward exploring the effects which technology transfer has had on their economies, growth patterns and socio-political dynamics. All three nations have had colonial pasts and a history of foreign domination or exploitation. Each has distinct characteristics, however, which will lend balance and breadth of insight to the discussion.
I. Critical Features of Technology Transfer Modes and Modalities
The end of World War II ushered in an era of relative prosperity and cooperation which had not existed in several decades. The Marshall Plan, designed as a massive American Aid Package to reconstruct war-ravaged Europe, served as the fundamental model for international cooperation in the contemporary age of international trade, commerce, development and reconstruction. The success of this effort cannot be underestimated and its inspiring example prompted both North America's and Europe's intelligentsia, as well as their financial communities, to consider launching further efforts to improve conditions in the Third World. Surely through the lingering Colonial Period, until 1960, good intentions were mixed with bad. On balance, the industrialized countries profited during the post-war years and the Third World "limped by", gaining some technological, educational and infrastructural improvements, but not prospering in the true sense of the word. In fact, European Powers exploited their colonies' wealth, and did so, ironically, after the benefits of the Marshall Plan had rebuilt their own economies. (Samuelson, 1990)
For practical analytical purposes, Asia and South America will not be directly addressed in these pages; however, their development paradigms followed essentially the same patterns described within the post-colonial African context discussed below. Mexico, influenced heavily by its geographic proximity to the United States will be analyzed separately for comparative purposes.
The end of the Algerian Revolution in 1959 and 1960 led virtually immediately to the collapse of the Colonial System worldwide. In particular, the newly independent nations of Africa, both Saharan and Sub-Saharan, produced prominent leaders like Nkwame Nkrumah, Jomo Kenyatta, Ahmed Ben Bella and Joseph Désiré Mobutu all of whom began to envision socio-economic models of various sorts for their respective nations. The Cold War heavily influenced early technology trading patterns, of course, as Ghana swung to the Left and Kenya maintained Commonwealth ties, for example. Some major nations, like the Democratic Republic of the Congo, entered a period of prolonged uncertainty, in this case a 5-year Civil War which culminated in a repressive military regime under the joint "Belgo-American sponsored" leadership of Mobutu for decades. (Aronson, 1977).
Under these diverse circumstances, a variety of technology transfer "vehicles" or systems developed. Reference will be made in forthcoming pages to these various models as they pertain to the three Country Case Studies presented. Figure I below itemizes several of the major administrative models and organizational modalities typically used, even today, to transfer technology to the Third World:
"VEHICLES" FOR TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY TO RECIPIENT NATIONS
1. Multinational Joint Venture : Host Government and Int'l Corporation 2. Wholly-Owned Recipient : In-Country Entity, 100% Local Control 3. Entrepreneurship : Small Businessmen Cooperating with Foreign Company 4. Technical Cooperation Package : Assistance from European Governments 5. Consortium : Temporary Construction Contracts In Host Country 6. Alliance Model : On-Going Collaboration among Host & Foreign Companies
FIGURE I
Under all of these models, it is necessary to ensure that goals and objectives remain "congruent." Indeed, the interests of the developing country must be served and governmental or societal priorities must be honored. In centrally planned economies, the transfer of technology from industrialized nations must conform to Host Planning Ministries' expectations and budgetary constraints. This is the case, even if tied-aid or no-strings attached assistance is being offered. (Lado, 1996; Metz, 1994)
Projects that were not "congruent" were and remain plentiful. Dictators such as the late President Mobutu of ex-Zaire, preferred to embark on showcase projects, such as his Presidential Farm at N'sele, where minor impact on his country as a whole was produced. (Aronson, 1977) These types of projects were shunned by other leaders who had their country's long-range interests in mind. Donor nations, however, sometimes forged ahead with plans to build showcase projects simply because the financial incentive was present and shallow diplomatic goals were actually the "driving force" behind the project.
The degree of interdependency fostered by technological exchange programs must also be assessed. Egypt, for example, became instantly dependent on the former Soviet Union for Aswan Dam turbine replacement parts and recognized, relatively early in the technology-transfer game, what interdependency really entails. (M'Bendi, 1996; Lado, 1996)
Another crucial aspect of technology transfer to the Third World involves the ever-present "risk of expropriation", that is to say, the host government literally stealing the technology, perhaps for unauthorized internal use, perhaps for resale abroad at a profit, in violation of the terms of the initial agreement. The unauthorized use of technology can also occur on a private basis, among individuals or entities who have financial or political incentives to motivate them. For this reason, governments are careful to police and enforce contractual arrangements whenever possible and industrialized nations are cautious in dealings with so-called rogue-regimes. (Jacoby, 1977)
Interestingly, there are well recognized and established flow-patterns of technology. Notably, the horizontal flow of expertise can be defined as on-going exchanges of fairly innocuous technical information, such as salt-refining processes or oil extraction know-how. This information flows horizontally from the industrialized nation to the recipient government or entity. Both parties are aware of the benefits and peculiarities of this technology on an equal footing. (Lado, 1996)
Vertical exchange of information, on the contrary, entails an unequal exchange. Under this scenario, nuclear fuel, for example, may be provided to a Third World nation for a specific peaceful purpose. The host nation cannot replicate this technology and the transfer remains that of a vertical nature, i.e. the industrialized nation feeding sophisticated technology to an underdeveloped recipient. One such case might be the "yellow-cake technology" transferred by Italy to Papua - New Guinea or to Indonesia where technical staff in those Less Developed Countries (LDCs) are unfamiliar with the production and use of this fissionable material. (Jackson, 1978; Mangone, 1977)
In the three illustrative case studies to follow, other concepts inherently critical to transfer of technology will also be addressed and their impact assessed. Among them are:
INHERENTLY CRITICAL ASPECTS OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
1. financing modalities 5. socio-political and diplomatic implications 2. degree of ownership 6. absorptive capacity of recipient 3. managerial models 7. types of technology: content & context 4. proprietary rights issues 8. ecological disruption
FIGURE II
A balanced selection of representative recipient nations, Algeria, Congo-Kinshasa and Mexico, should afford the reader an opportunity to take note of the variations and complexities associated historically, and in recent times, with technology transfer and its related effects on both the industrialized supplier nation and on the less-developed recipient.
I I. The Case of Algeria
During the 1960 to 1990 period, transfer of technology to the Democratic Republic of Algeria reached considerable levels of intensity, particularly in the petroleum, natural gas and mining sectors, all of which involve extractive technologies.
Prior to the Evian Accords which, in 1959, settled the Franco-Algerian War of Independence, Algeria had received almost exclusive technical assistance in the form of unilateral cooperation initiatives, packaged and exported from France, its colonial master. The French not only imprinted Algeria for over 150 years with their language, culture and bureaucratic system, but provided rudimentary labor-intensive forms of basic assistance which were useful only to their own nation's priorities. (Metz, 1994)
Algerians were trained, prior to 1959, as second-class citizens in their own land. Thereafter, successive Post-Independence governments provided the platform for more meaningful and potentially long-lasting development.
From 1960 onward, great strides were made in Algeria, through the transfer of technology and expertise, principally in the following sectors of national life, during the respective Presidencies noted below:
ALGERIAN DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES
Education, Housing and Health - Ahmed Ben Bella Infrastructural Improvements - Houari Boumedienne Industrial Production - Houari Boumedienne Mineral Extraction - Chadli Benjedid and Lamine Zeroual Agricultural Development - Ahmed Ben Bella Tourism - Houari Boumedienne Petroleum and Gas Refining - under all post-colonial administrations Source: Metz, H.C., Algeria: A Country Study, Fifth Edition, USGPO, Washington, D.C., 1994, passim.
FIGURE III
Because Algeria was, and remains, an essentially centrally planned nation, State-Owned Ministries and Monopolies control much of the technology transferred from other nations. In the early years of independence, Algeria relied heavily on the Eastern Bloc Nations and on the Soviet Union for technical assistance. While France was definitely present to ensure transitional operations, technical trading partners became gradually more diverse, and reliance on the French diminished in favor of pacts with East Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, the U.S.S.R., Spain, Italy and, lastly, the United States to a comparatively minor degree. (M'Bendi, 1996)
The various types of technological exchanges which took place in the early years of Algeria's industrialization program, under the Ben Bella and Boumedienne presidencies, involved many of the models alluded to above (see Figure I).
Surely, the joint-venture model was heavily favored in the 1970s and 1980s, due to a need to train Algerian workers in the operation and maintenance of newly acquired state-of-the-art equipment in use at project sites throughout the nation. As Algerians assimilated the required skills, whole ownership transfers took place, with industrialized nations granting full operational and proprietary rights to recipient firms on Algerian soil. This was true particularly in the petro-chemical industry, which comprises, even today, over 90% of Algeria's industrial activity. (Metz, 1994)
While firms like Atlantic-Richfield Corporation actually designed and constructed many of the facilities in use throughout the Sahara, Algerian personnel generally assume full responsibility for their on-going operation. Proceeds from processed oil and gas generally reimburse the construction and development contractor for the technology provided and all costs incurred during the building phase. These arrangements vary, of course, according to the nature of agreements signed in advance. However, Western supplier-nations (the US, France, Italy) frequently insist on a portion of revenue produced to offset cost of design, technology-transfer and construction. Often such "royalties" are paid over a period of several decades until indebtedness is eliminated.
In the case of a recent ARCO agreement, however, in a partial reversal of this classical arrangement, the Corporation agreed to pay an up-front sum in the hundreds of millions of dollars, to the Government of Algeria for the right to develop oil fields in the Sahara and then reap, ostensibly for an unlimited period of time, a percentage of the production proceeds as compensation. (Greenstein, 1996)
In Post-Colonial Algeria, a socialist overlay to the political and financial structure dominated technology transfer patterns. Although there were small scale transfers of expertise occurring, largely in the areas of education and tourism, the major flow-patterns were government-to-government pacts, or state monopoly agreements with major overseas providers. (Samuelson, 1990)
Private entrepreneurship in Algeria was not visibly encouraged during the 1970s and 1980s. Craftsmen and artisans maintained their niche in society and new tools and techniques were seldom absorbed by small businessmen. Similarly, computerization was occurring in the administrative sector, but only gradually and with major competitive struggles emerging between the former colonial power and other supplier nations who were eager to tap the Algerian market. As Algeria "reached out"more often to its Arab brother-nations and to the former Socialist Bloc, France felt increasingly marginalized, but still retained a reasonably sizable percentage of the Algerian market. (Metz, 1994; M'Bendi, 1996)
One outstanding example of an Algero-American Joint Venture project in the early 1980s was the El Outaya Salt Refinery Project during the course of which a 70 million dollar rock-salt processing facility was designed and constructed near the town of Biskra on the northern fringes of the Sahara. Under this arrangement, Dravo Corporation, based in Pittsburgh, provided technology and engineering expertise for the refinery, coordinated the construction of the plant and set in motion, through Mellon Bank and other major transnational banking institutions, all facets of financial support for the project. Simultaneously, Dravo was completing a zinc mining project in El Abed, south of Oran, which had enjoyed the approval and encouragement of SONAREM, the Algerian Mining Monopoly. (Madsen, 1996)
Morrison-Knudsen International of Boise, Idaho, had also embarked in the late 1970s on a series of projects in Béchar and Blida which, by fits and starts, ultimately materialized and were deemed successful. Reportedly, there were delays in the Algerian segment of financing for some of these projects; but, on balance, the Government of Algeria honored its commitments, as did the American Firms. (Madsen, 1996)
Recent events in Algeria may have interfered with the normal flow of technology which might have otherwise been expected. An Internal Insurgency Movement, resulting in the deaths of over 60,000 persons, has developed. This disruption has understandably discouraged foreign cooperation, although major oil companies have been honoring their obligations to the Government of Algeria in spite of threats by insurgents of physical harm against company personnel. (General Internet News Services, 1997-98)
Given the political uncertainty, the types of projects which can be currently envisioned, are obviously limited to major, isolated and well shielded extraction sites deep in the Sahara. These projects provide on-going revenue for Algeria to attempt stabilization of social conditions in the country, with the objective of further development. At this juncture, all things considered, goals established by the current Zéroual government seem to be "congruent" in relation to their overseas corporate suppliers of technical assistance. (Lado, 1996; Metz, 1994)
As a result of this low-key technology transfer, whatever its current limitations may be, Algeria is moving toward achievement of national industrial output goals and objectives. It is fair to state that Algerian society as a whole is benefiting principally through enhanced revenues from oil and natural gas reserves.
III. The Case of Congo-Kinshasa (ex-Zaire)
Currently known as the Democratic Republic of Congo, formerly Zaire, but referred to popularly as Congo-Kinshasa to distinguish it from its counterpart Congo-Brazzaville, this nation has undergone tremendous transitions and upheavals, since independence from Belgium in 1960. For a number of striking reasons it can be classified as the quintessential Third World nation. Congo-Kinshasa is an equatorial African nation, phenomenally rich in strategic minerals, tropical hardwoods, diamonds, and hydroelectric potential. For several hundred years The Congo Basin, as well as the mining areas of Shaba Province have been exploited to varying degrees by European nations eager to capitalize on the country's natural wealth. The financial motive, therefore, throughout the last 38 years since Independence, has been ever-present in the technology-transfer equation. (Transnational Research Associates, 1996)
The Congo's manpower, however, is poorly trained. At the time of Independence, only two university graduates were known to exist. Now, while several tens of thousands of Congolese possess degrees from marginally reputed local universities, and some from European schools, the overwhelming majority of citizens are illiterate and unskilled in terms of contemporary standards. The Mobutu Regime, dubbed a "kleptocracy", all but destroyed the intellectual classes of the nation and discouraged serious research during its 32 year reign. (Executive Interview, 1998)
Transfer of technology was nonetheless possible under the Mobutu Government. Because the regime was maintained in power by Belgium, France and the United States, at least until the collapse of the West's arch-rival, the U.S.S.R., several western nations embarked on ambitious development schemes, some of which actually increased mineral production and boosted then Zaire's export ratings in a number of categories.
Historically, major consortiums, comprised of several large construction or engineering firms, collaborated on impressive "mega-projects" during the Mobutu era, which ended only last year with the triumphal march of Laurent Kabila's troops into the capital city, Kinshasa. (Transnational Research Associates, 1996)
The "consortium approach" was well adapted to Mobutu's Zaire because:
(1) the country's workforce required extensive on-site training; (2) materials and equipment were in short-supply; (3) massive logistical problems confronted constructors; and (4) financing required a joint-strategy.
FIGURE IV
With reference to the fourth point above, such a quest for funds had to be led by several major companies, jointly, due to the sums involved and the nature of investment risks perceived by international and governmental lending agencies. Ultimately because of these risks, the U.S. Treasury underwrote, as "guarantor of last resort", a 1.1 billion dollar loan package which extended well beyond the year 2020. (Transnational Research Associates, 1996)
Over the decades, the Mobutu Government, under the financial leadership of Finance Minister Namwisi, dealt with dozens of major world lenders and banking groups. (Kwitny, 1984) Most were ultimately disappointed in the nation's performance. Loans were rescheduled several times; interest soared; debt service payments were in default; and IMF restrictions choked the Congolese people's progress, as the dictator enriched himself. The President's personal wealth was approximately equal to his nation's national debt, five and a half billion dollars, as early as the mid 1970s. (Aronson, 1977)
The names of some lending agencies which financed Zaire's national development projects are provided below:
1. The African Development Bank
2. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
3. The Paris and London Clubs
4. The Export-Import Bank of the United States
5. The World Bank
6. The European Economic Community Lending Facility
7. The International Monetary Fund
8. Private Banking Consortiums: Barclays, Chicago Continental, Manufacturer's
Hanover, Société Générale, Crédit Lyonnais, First National of Boston, FNCB-City
Bank, among others.
Source: "Corporate Diplomacy in the Third World", TRA, 1996
FIGURE V
There seems to be some optimism in financial circles concerning the managerial and ethical stance of the new government, although most lending agencies feel that it is too soon to determine the course of the new Congo's progress. Western firms are negotiating with the new government, but are experiencing problems even at this early stage (e.g. the case of American Mineral Fields). It is important to note that, in dealing with newly established regimes in the Third World, many of those who rise to power were themselves corrupt and unethical while attaining their lofty positions. In the case of Laurent Kabila, he was a gold-smuggler along the Rwandan Border with ex-Zaire for several decades, organizing supporters and a small militia to protect his operations. (Wall Street Journal, April 14, 1997)
Among technology-transfer projects in Zaire's recent history, many of which were evaluated in the hundreds of millions, even billions, of U.S. dollars, were the following:
SELECTED TECHNOLOGY-TRANSFER PROJECTS FROM 1965 TO 1998
IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO
Inga Hydroelectric Dam Project - Italian and French Metallurgical Complex at Maluku - German Inga-Shaba Extra High Voltage D.C. Transmission Line - American - Swedish - Italian Gecamines Copper Mining & Refining Site at Kolwezi - Belgian and French People's Palace in Lingwala - Chinese Tenké-Fungurumé Mines in Shaba - Japanese and Canadian Mbuji-Mayi / Tshipaka MIBA Diamond Mining Concessions - Belgian and French Zairian World Trade Center and the Sozacom Skyscraper - French and Belgian Presidential Farm at N'Sele - Chinese Kinshasa-Dilolo-Lubumbashi Railway Maintenance Project - Belgian World-Class Hotels: Intercontinental, Karavia, Okapi, Memling - American and Belgian Deep-Water Port Facilities at Boma and Banana - E.E.C. Copper Tailings Project at Kipushi - American and South African
Source: AZAP Communiqués, 1975-1985; AMF Releases, 1997; Interview: Former Executive, 3/98, Aronson, 1977.
FIGURE VI
In most instances, these projects failed to generate funds sufficient (1) to provide revenue to the dictator and his entourage, and, at the same time, (2) to remain decently self-supporting. The World Trade Center, an impressive French-constructed skyscraper, was occupied for several months when an air-conditioning failure occurred. Because all windows were sealed shut, in accordance with French design standards, the multi-million dollar complex had to be evacuated and stood useless for years. Funds were simply not available for repair of the air-conditioning system. (Executive Interview, 1998)
The Inga-Shaba Line, according to articles published in La Libre Belgique in the 1980s, was operating at 10% of intended capacity, after more than one billion dollars and nine years had been expended on its construction. Even 10% of capacity (550 KVA in the First Phase and 1100 KVA in the Second Phase) reportedly threw the Shaba Electrical Grid into disarray due to electrical overload of the somewhat antiquated, pre-existing Belgian distribution system. These reports may have been motivated by political rivalries; however, many disturbing factual details concerning this project, and others, have emerged in recent years. (Transnational Research Associates, 1996)
Congo-Kinshasa, therefore, is a nation which, unless the new leader turns his bureaucratic apparatus toward a more efficient model of governance and planning, seems to pursue goals which are both inconsistent and incongruent in relation to the needs of the nation. Indeed, the Planning Ministry of Zaire, and one might validly assume, of the new Democratic Republic of the Congo under President Kabila, seemed, and seems, thwarted by dozens of factors over which it had little or no control. Many of these factors were related to corruption, mismanagement and bureaucratic turmoil. Unlike Algeria, where a semblance of order existed prior to the current hostilities, in the Congo, there seems to be a truly irreversible tendency toward entropic decay and regression, in spite of many noble efforts to improve the country's standard of living.
In the case of Zaire, therefore, whatever models of technology transfer seemed to be implemented, failure was frequently the ultimate result of well-intentioned efforts to transfer sophisticated know-how to the Heart of Africa. This may also prove to be the case in decades to come, as Laurent Kabila turns initially to the Mainland Chinese Model (poorly paid work brigades) for redevelopment of his nation's infrastructure. (General AP Press Release, February 1998)
IV. The Case of Mexico
Mexico is not entirely typical of Latin American development trends and patterns. Its tumultuous history has been intermingled with a powerful northern neighbor and with two European nations, Spain and France, whose bureaucracies left socio-political institutions which differ somewhat from those established by Spain, England and Portugal, at various periods, in the Caribbean, Central and South America.
Because of the dynamics of trade patterns developed in recent years with the United States, and Canada to a markedly lesser degree, under the NAFTA Agreement and other accords, Mexico's impoverished south has remained relatively undeveloped, and a northward migratory pattern seems to have emerged, culminating in rapid expansion of its Northern Frontier sector, known by specialists, quite simply, as "The Borderlands."
Technology-transfer patterns in Mexico have included cooperative alliances, joint ventures and whole ownership models. Brief attention to three or four such projects might shed light on the diverse nature of technical cooperation projects underway in Mexico at this juncture. Those which come immediately to mind are:
REPRESENTATIVE TECHNOLOGY-TRANSFER PROJECTS IN MEXICO
1. The Maquilladoras (Japanese, American, Korean and Taiwanese) 2. The Fish Cannery Project in Baja Norte (French) 3. Tourism Development Initiatives in Cancun, Mazatlan and Puerto Vallarta (Various) 4. The Ford-Mazda Assembly Plant in Hermosillo (Japanese, American) 5. Telmex Improvement Initiative (American, French)
FIGURE VII
One surprising trend which seems to be emerging within the context of Mexico's internal development seems to involve cooperation with Asian nations. The Japanese, for example, have found the source of inexpensive Mexican labor to be attractive, enabling them to realize considerable profits on their vehicles and manufactured goods when resold abroad or at home. In fact, the Mexican workforce is reasonably well trained and has become increasingly more sophisticated as it gains experience, particularly along the U.S. frontier.
Not only has Japan found this source of labor lucrative, but Korea, Taiwan and, recently, Mainland China have been cooperating with the Mexican Government on organizing cooperative projects, featuring sophisticated technology transfer. (Jiang Ze Ming Visit, Xinghua, 1998) Manufacture of computerized and electronic equipment is becoming increasingly visible along the Border at the various maquilladora plants established for this purpose. Women are joining the work force in increasing numbers, changing cultural patterns initially set for centuries in Mexico by the Spaniards and, briefly, by the French.
In fact, although the French were dislodged from power in the 19th Century, French-Mexican cooperation has proven to be a major source of technology-transfer, in addition to the obvious impact of the United States and Japan. Not only has the fish cannery project south of San Felipe (Baja Norte) become a successful venture involving the French, but the Mexican Telephone System has been completely renovated with French technical assistance.
Gary Chapman, writing in the Los Angeles Times, mentions the growth of electronic communication in Mexico as this phenomenon relates to the Telmex Phone System. He comments on the cooperative venture which improved Telmex, and was comprised of Mexican, French and American corporations:
"The growth of the Internet has until recently been very slow, in large part because of the abysmal performance of the national telephone system run by Telmex,Telefonos de Mexico, which, until 1990, was a stateowned monopoly. Under the Salinas government, Telmex was privatized and sold to a consortium of companies including the Mexican conglomerate Grupo Carso, France Telecom, and Southwestern Bell of the U.S."
"When Telmex was sold, it had only about 5 million access lines to serve a population of over 80 million people, and service was slow, unreliable, and expensive. Nevertheless, Telmex has been, and continues to be, one of the world's most profitable companies." (G. Chapman, L.A. Times, October 28, 1996)
Whether the Telmex profitability rating, mentioned by Chapman, translates into "technical efficiency" is open to question, of course; yet, improvements made in the nationwide system are obviously worthy of note. Unlike Algeria, where recent violence has marred technical cooperation programs, or the Congo, where endemic corruption halts progress, multinational initiatives seem to result in noticeable progress in Mexico, when all parties cooperate forthrightly and with a sense of purpose. Goals, therefore, seem to be congruent with national interests and "mesh" well with available external assistance suppliers.
Because of population demographics and the intense level of activity along the U.S. Mexican frontier, there are a number of troublesome aspects associated with technology transfer in this area which do not seem to be surfacing dramatically in the vast expanses of the Sahara or in the relatively sparsely populated areas of the Southern Congo. Ecologists and environmentalist are voicing concern about pollution-related issues and about blatant contamination of precious watershed resources in Texas, New Mexico, Arizona and California. The Mexican side of the border is also adversely impacted by this phenomenon, and, many observers feel, is actually bearing the brunt of the negative effects of overly rapid development.
Some of the major negative features of mis-coordinated technology-transfer programs, and particularly those in Northern Mexico, include the following:
It is highly doubtful whether actual proof of the relationship between the extent of technology-transfer programs and these social ills can be established. However, in the case of Mexico, planning must be conducted carefully, in conjunction with international agencies, to avoid a proliferation of these and other conditions. Attention must be paid to education programs, job training and social service networks on both sides of the border. Employers, as well, must be sensitized to these issues in an effort to improve the quality of life for all individuals participating in these fast-growth maquilla-type industries where technology seems to be outpacing human capacity to cope with certain consequences.
V. Brief Analytical Synthesis of Technology-Transfer Initiatives
The existing body of literature focused on technology transfer models seems to suggest that the patterns which have been analyzed above, both in introductory remarks and within the context of the three Country Case Studies, are more broadly typical of other nations and regions as well. Although the cultural characteristics of Asia may differ from the traditions and patterns of Africa and Latin America, and the impact of technology transfer may affect Asians, for example, in a variety of ways, it is important to recognize that the dissemination of technology is, on balance, a positive feature of 20th and 21st Century developmental trends. Information technology, as a case in point, is crucial to the enlightenment of peoples around the world. That a Congolese business executive might have access to the Financial Times of London or Le Soir of Brussels in milliseconds is indication enough of the benefits of such technology. Care must be taken to avoid disruptive growth patterns, however, and congruence must remain a salient feature of all projects and programs envisioned by the governments of developing nations.
As attention was turned to the case of Algeria, it was noted that the governmental system in place tends to shape and control the extent and nature of technical cooperation programs allowed to operatate within national boundaries. By and large, Algeria's goals for development are oriented toward its vast petroleum and natural gas reserves, and the proceeds form these resources are allocated for development in other areas of the national economy. While the joint-venture model in the 1970s and 1980s seems to have been the ideal format for infusion of technological progress into Algeria, more recently other models have been in favor, as Algerians move toward technical autonomy and in-country expertise.
In the case of Equatorial Africa, notably with regard to Congo-Kinshasa, participants in the North-South Dialogue learned a harsh lesson throughout much of the post-Independence period. Logistical nightmares, insolvency, non-payment and poor planning plagued development efforts in this nation. Many "pointers" however were acquired and lenders, entrepreneurs and multinational firms now know how to deal with Third World governments in this region of the globe. The lure of potential profits remains, naturally, a major incentive in the case of Congo-Kinshasa, where internal inconsistencies and inefficiencies may be "overlooked" or "de-emphasized" by future lenders and technologists.
When turning toward the North American theater of technical exchange programs, new challenges and risks appear. Although labor is relatively skilled and plentiful, imbalance from an ecological and sociological standpoint is looming as a major obstacle.
What final observations can be validly generated from this exploratory discussion of technology-transfer patterns and paradigms? It is well known that development is related to the ethos of a people, to the social psychology of a nation, and to their citizens' sometimes shifting priorities. What needs to be avoided, perhaps, in efforts to expand the horizons of other nations is the trend identified by Shrumpeter as early as 1934 toward "creative destruction." (cited in Lado, 1996) Indeed, it is crucial that technology transfer contribute constructively to the welfare of all peoples and that developed nations assume the responsibility of subordinating "quick profit" to the higher goal of balanced, sane dissemination of ever-evolving technology in an increasingly complex international environment.
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