Interview Conducted in El Paso, Texas on March 13, 1998
Student: Mr. Madsen, I understand that you were Chief Translator of Constructeurs Inga-Shaba, an American Multinational Consortium, in the Republic of Zaire from 1974 to 1984.
Madsen: Yes, with the exception of one year spent in Algeria from Summer of 1977 to Summer of 1978, and a year at Graduate School in the Canadian Maritimes, I was Executive Translator for Morrison-Knudsen International's Operations in Zaire for approximately seven years. MKI led the One Billion Dollar Consortium which built the Inga-Shaba Extra High Voltage D.C. Transmission Line from the mouth of the Congo River to the Interior of the country where Copper Ore was mined and refined, some 1700 kilometers away from the source of hydroelectric power in Inga.
Student: So, it would be appropriate to describe you as an expert on American construction and engineering projects in both Algeria and Zaire during this decade?
Madsen: In a manner of speaking, yes. I interacted with Corporate Executives, Host Government Officials, Ambassadors, Financial Organizations, Labor Unions, the International Press Corps and other Corporate Personnel in Kinshasa, Algiers, Paris, Pittsburgh and Boise at various times throughout this period.
Student: What was the magnitude of the two projects on which you worked in North and Central Africa?
Madsen: The El Outaya Salt Refinery was estimated to cost approximately 70 Million U.S. Dollars, not adjusted for inflation; whereas the Inga Shaba Transmission Line was valued at 1.1 Billion U.S. Dollars, representing America's largest aid project in Africa during the 1980s.
Student: In Zaire, were you called upon to translate at press conferences, various corporate meetings and government functions?
Madsen: Frequently. Because there were only three competent French-English translators in the American Expatriate Community in Kinshasa, I was generally in demand at important functions, such as ceremonies, press conferences or private meetings among dignitaries at the IMF, The Bank of Zaire, the U.S. Embassy or the Zairian Finance Ministry, for example.
Student: During many of these meetings, quite a bit of information must have been at your disposal. You were in a position to absorb a tremendous amount of detail concerning your project and the activities of other firms or government agencies in Zaire and neighboring countries. Did you keep notes or compose reports focusing on these negotiating sessions and business meetings?
Madsen: I was responsible for preparing bilingual Minutes of all such meetings, and for interpreting bilingually during the actual meetings. So, yes, hundreds of reports and documents were generated by myself and my Translation Department, over a period of five or six years, as the Inga-Shaba project gained momentum.
Student: Were all dealings during these meetings in compliance with U.S. Ethical Practice?
Madsen: Because we were not on U.S. soil, we were bound only by the Laws of Zaire. Zaire was deemed a "kleptocracy" at the time. While we were responsible to the Board of Directors in Boise, Idaho, many transactions escaped their attention, and funds were not always accounted for properly. Envelopes containing large amounts of cash frequently changed hands at meetings and at government-sponsored dinners or receptions. This was the nature of business in Zaire. If the Americans did not participate, the Belgians, Italians and French would surely have obliged the Zairian officials who were in charge of vast sectors of the local economy.
Student: What was one such transaction which comes to mind?
Madsen: We had a series of meetings annually with the UNTZA, the Zairian National Labor Union, representing electrical and petroleum workers throughout the country. I was amazed at the degree to which these negotiations were prepared, almost choreographed and staged, in advance. Gifts, money and favors were granted by Management to the National Secretary of the Union in exchange for his "assurances" that management's goals and targets, in terms of worker-salaries and benefits, would be respected, even guaranteed, prior to the negotiating sessions. There was virtually no flexibility for worker-delegates to bargain on behalf of impoverished workers.
Student: That certainly sounds like a clear-cut violation of ethical principles. In Kinshasa, perhaps among other expatriate groups, were there any other incidents or unusual scandals dealing with graft, money or corruption?
Madsen: There were dozens, practically daily. These types of incidents served as simple breakfast conversation among executives. One much laughed about example of financial mismanagement and poor planning involved the C.C.I.Z. building, the Zairian World Trade Center.
Student: What happened?
Madsen: The French literally "exported" a skyscraper to Kinshasa. The design for the 20 story building was completed in Paris and honored all French building standards and norms. It was a magnificent complex, built in an exclusive section of Kinshasa not far from the Intercontinental Hotel. It cost millions of dollars and included underground parking, landscaping, impressive access ramps, circular driveways and so forth.
Several months after the building was completed, and all distinguished occupants were settled in their respective suites of the main tower, the air-conditioning system broke down. No funding was available for its repair, since the "gesture of friendship" from France included the complex, but NOT its on-going operating and maintenance expenses. All the windows in the skyscraper, from top to bottom, were sealed shut -- unopenable in 120 degree tropical heat -- and the entire building had to be evacuated, due to the suffocating conditions. This included the Minister of Planning, Citizen Bokana, whose luxurious suite was on the top floor.
French standards did not allow for windows to be opened in such a building, of course, and, in Zaire, it had become a "tomb..." The French were the object of many jokes, as were the Zairians...understandably. The building stood empty for more than a year, and I don't know what finally occurred.
Student: Turning briefly to Algeria, could you describe the relationship between the Government and the Joint-Venture contractor?
Madsen: The Government of Algeria was socialist in orientation. It insisted on maintaining a 51% share of all authority on the project, in other words the controlling and decision-making power. Relations were cordial, although the private portion (Dravo Corporation) of the Joint Venture often had disagreements with Government officials concerning disbursement of certain funds. This was always a delicate issue in government / corporation relations.
Student: Were there other administrative models or managerial paradigms serving as "vehicles" of technology-transfer in Algeria in the 1970s and 1980s?
Madsen: Yes, other corporations shared technology in different ways. Besides the joint venture approach (which was ours), there was the whole ownership model, in the case of French firms, usually. who entrusted the entire operation to Algerians. Oil and gas corporations also designed a variety of organizational models to meet their particular needs, such as technical cooperation packages where an entire segment of technology was transferred, such as a refining or crystallization process, for example. Many firms also worked closely with their governments, such as Hungary which supplied medical personnel and agricultural assistance. This could be described as a diplomatic "alliance" model.
Student: Thank you, we have been discussing these various models in class. Incidentally, did cost overruns constitute a problem in negotiations with the Government of Algeria at any point in the construction phase of the El Outaya Plant on which you were working?
Madsen: On several occasions our cost-estimators came up with different figures for the El Outaya Plant. The initial estimate was on the order of 40 million dollars, whereas the final price, two years later, actually approached 70 million. The Government did not react favorably to these changes, and sometimes the American Embassy had to exert behind-the-scenes pressure on Algerian officials to accept the new estimate...by threatening to discontinue certain foreign aid funds. Ultimately, SONAREM, the state monopoly, accepted the terms on condition that improvements were built into the plant complex. The improvements were beyond the original design specifications.
Student: Can you describe several other examples of technology-transfer in effect during the period we are discussing?
Madsen: There was the El Abed Zinc Mine near the Moroccan Border, constructed and operated by Dravo Corporation in the 1975 to 1979 timeframe. This project ended up in the World Court, in The Hague (Holland), when Morocco discovered that Algeria had been mining zinc underground on the Moroccan side of the border without authorization.
There was also the Blida seed-cleaning plant built by Morrison Knudsen Corporation. Construction of the final phase of this plant was delayed in 1978 due to partial non-payment by the Government of Algeria.
Student: On balance, would you say that technology transfer was more "effective" in Algeria or in Zaire, and how were these two societies impacted by the projects of which you are aware?
Madsen: There is no doubt that Algeria made better use of the technology given to its people. The projects in Algeria were appropriate, well-planned and were not showcase facilities, as in Zaire. Under the Mobutu Government in Kinshasa, there were many poor decisions, influenced by competing interests and companies, which threw the planning process into a state of confusion. Massive sums of money were spent in Zaire needlessly and on useless or wasteful schemes.
Student: You seem to imply that Zaire, at least, was unable to absorb the technology offered its people. Do you have any concluding thoughts regarding technology transfer in the Third World?
Madsen: The process of granting funds for development projects in the Third World must be reviewed and perhaps modified. Priorities should be established which will benefit the recipient nation, at minimal cost to the donor nation. Business and industry must avoid placing high priority on profit. They must also consider the welfare of the developing nation and the overall image of their firm abroad.
Student: Thank you, Sir, your insights have been most helpful to my project.